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Abstract 
This paper critically examines the trade and technology theories which dominate 
the large and growing literature on the determinants of changes in income 
inequality in advanced industrial countries during the 1980s and 1990s. Both 
theories, despite their rather different approaches to the subject are shown to have a 
common premise: advanced countries have experienced a fall in the relative 
demand for unskilled labour and an increase in that of skilled labour. This single 
explanation for both phenomena has been dubbed the 'transatlantic consensus'. 
This paper argues that this consensus, together with the associated theories based 
on trade with the Third World and skill biased technological progress respectively, 
is analytically as well as empirically unsatisfactory. It puts forward an alternative 
analysis which emphasises the role of institutions (e.g. unions, minimum wages), 
macro-economic conditions and social norms. It naturally arrives at rather different 
policy conclusions from those of the orthodox economists. 
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For half a century or more, until about 1980, earnings distribution in the 
US was becoming more equal; the differentials between the highly and 
less highly paid employees were declining. The situation began to 
change in the late 1970s, and in the 1980s wage dispersion and income 
inequality rose substantially. This deterioration in earnings and income 
distribution occurred not only in the US but also in other advanced 
countries. Changes in the degree of inequality, however, greatly varied 
between countries. In general, the extent of worsening of earnings and 
income distribution among Western European countries in the 1980’s 
was much less than in the US, the UK being a notable exception. Indeed, 
if income distribution is measured in post-tax and benefit terms, some 
leading West European countries showed hardly any increase in income 
inequality at all. On the other hand, these countries experienced a much 
higher level of unemployment than the US. 
 
To account for the observed changes in income distribution and 
employment in advanced countries, a vast literature has sprung up.  Most 
contributors have ascribed these phenomena to either trade with 
developing countries or to technology. However, despite the 
concentration on just two factors, even by the normal standards of 
controversies in economics, this literature is unusually fractious. There 
are major disagreements among, and between, trade and labour 
economists about the best methodology for analysing these phenomena 
and for interpreting the empirical results
1. 
 
A correct analysis of these questions is, however, not only of academic 
interest but has much wider significance as these bear directly on issues 
of great public concern. Many workers and trade unionists, particularly 
in the US, attribute their stagnant real wages as well as increased wage 
dispersion to competition from products of sweatshop labour in 
developing countries.  In contrast, much of the economic establishment 
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believes that liberalisation of trade and globalisation has been an 
important force in raising the standard of living of the people in the US.  
A guide to public policy in this area, whether it involves changing or 
maintaining the status quo, clearly requires a valid and robust analysis of 
the underlying phenomena.   
 
The main purpose of this paper is to review the trade and technology 
theories and to suggest that neither of them is theoretically satisfactory 
nor empirically valid for explaining inequality and unemployment in 
advanced countries during the 1980s and 1990s. The paper outlines a 
broader alternative perspective, which leads to a rather different analysis 
and policy conclusions than those that follow from trade and/or 
technology stories put forward in the existing literature.   
 
2. Income inequality, unemployment and de-industrialisation in 
advanced countries (1980s and 1990s) 
 
During the last twenty years, labour markets in advanced countries have, 
to a greater or lesser degree, suffered from major deficits.  The most 
important of these are: (a) increased wage dispersion and greater income 
inequality, particularly in the US and the UK; (b) mass unemployment in 
a number of countries and (c) de-industrialisation.  The stylised facts 
concerning these phenomena which require explanation may be 
summarised as follows: 
 
i.  It is best to start with the US case, partly because much of the 
recent literature concerns labour market conditions and their 
determinants in that country.  The first important fact here is that 
real wages in the US stagnated in the period 1973 to 1995.  This 
was a departure from a long-term historical trend.  Blanchflower 
and Slaughter (1999) report that for nearly a century, until 1973, 
real average earnings in the US increased at a rate of 1.9 per cent 
per annum.  However, between 1973 and 1993 real wages fell at a 
rate of 0.4% for the average worker, and at a substantially faster 
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rate for the lowest paid workers. It has not been until the late 
nineteen nineties that there has been any increase at all in the real 
earnings of the lowest paid US workers and this came only with 
tight labour markets towards the end of the longest boom in the 
country’s history. 
 
ii.  The second important fact concerning the US labour markets is 
that there has been a widening of earnings distribution for various 
classes of workers.  Table 1 gives information on changes in 
earnings of different groups of US workers during the period 1979-
1995.  The table indicates that apart from the fact that the earnings 
of the top quintile of males rose marginally during this fifteen-year 
period, the bottom quintile experienced a decline of seventeen per 
cent.  The earnings of male college graduates rose by one per cent 
compared with a decline in the earnings of high school graduates 
by seventeen per cent.  Experienced college graduates did better 
than starting college graduates; high school graduates better than 
starting high school graduates; and professionals better than 
machine operators, labourers or clerical workers.  Although 
women’s earnings rose overall relative to men, the pattern of wage 
differentiation among women themselves was broadly similar to 
that observed for men.  
 
 
It is also important to note that earnings inequality rose not only 
between skill groups but also within the groups themselves. In 
other words, even within the same occupation group (doctors or 
lawyers) or among employees with similar years of education, 
earnings inequality rose.  Freeman (1999) reports that the top 
decile to bottom decile (D10/D1) ratio for college graduates 
increased from 3.46 in 1979 to 4.22 in 1995. 
 
iii.  Although earnings as well as income inequality rose in many 
OECD countries, particularly in the 1980s, the nature and extent of 
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the changes varied greatly between countries.  In general, the US 
and the UK recorded the largest increases in income inequality, 
whilst most continental European countries experienced relatively 
much smaller worsening of income distribution, if any (see, Tables 
2 and 3).  This is especially true of changes in income distribution 
after taxes and benefits, i.e. after taking into account the effects of 
the welfare state.  However, in contrast to the US, many European 
countries experienced mass unemployment.  This is attributed to 
the fact that relative to the US the labour markets of European 
countries were much less flexible owing to the greater strength of 
the welfare state in these countries
2.  This inflexibility helped to 
achieve a superior outcome in terms of income inequality, but at 
the expense of high or mass unemployment, as Table 4 indicates.  
 
iv.  The last, but by no means the least, important deficit in the 
advanced countries’ labour markets during the last two decades 
(certainly in the perceptions of workers in these countries), has 
been that of de-industrialisation.  There have been massive 
reductions in manufacturing employment or its share in the labour 
force in most advanced economies  (See Table 5).  However, the 
degree of de-industrialisation has varied between countries, with 
the UK recording the largest loss of manufacturing labour force 
during the period 1970 - 1993 - a fall of 45 per cent compared with 
the G7 average of about 15 per cent. 
 
3.  Trade and technology theories and The Transatlantic Consensus 
 
There exists by now an enormous literature to account for these 
observed tendencies in the advanced country labour markets.  The 
subject has naturally attracted the attention of both trade and labour 
economists.  Although the two groups approach these issues from 
different perspectives and use different empirical methodologies, they 
agree on one crucial point.  They concur that the fundamental underlying 
cause of both increased income inequality in the US and mass 
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unemployment in Europe is the fall in the relative demand for unskilled 
labour and increases in that of skilled labour.  Trade economists, using 
the Heckscher-Ohlin framework and the Stolper-Samuelson theorem, 
note that because the US exports skill-intensive products and imports 
less-skill-intensive products from the South, this would lead to a rise in 
the wages of skilled workers relative to those of the unskilled.  This in 
turn would increase wage dispersion, but importantly according to this 
theory changes in factor prices will materialise only through changes in 
relative product prices. Hence, for trade economists, the latter are the 
main objects of study. 
 
The labour economists, who generally conduct their research in terms of 
trade volumes rather than prices, also believe that increased wage 
dispersion in countries such as the US is being caused by the relative fall 
in the demand for unskilled labour and increase in the demand for the 
skilled labour.  However, they take the view that trade with the Third 
World can only account for a small portion of this fall in demand and 
that much the greater proportion comes from skill-biased technical 
change.  Labour economists attribute a much smaller role to trade in 
their analysis because trade with the South accounts for only a small 
proportion of US economic activity. They point out that although 
developing countries’ trade with advanced economies expanded at a 
very fast rate during the 1980s and 1990s, it started from very low 
levels.  As a result, even in 1995 manufacturing imports from 
developing countries constituted only about two and a half per cent of 
the total demand in the OECD economies. Labour economists therefore 
assign to technology, instead of trade, the main responsibility for 
reducing the demand for unskilled labour and increasing that of skilled 
labour, and hence for the widespread increased inequalities in the US 
economy. However, in West European economies, the same 
phenomenon manifests itself in terms of mass unemployment because of 





As Krugman (1994) observes:  
 
“the upward trend in unemployment in Europe is the result of 
market forces that ‘want’ to produce greater inequality of earnings.  
The collision between these market forces and the attempts of the 
welfare state to limit inequality then lead to higher 
unemployment.” 
 
Labour and trade economists thus have, despite all their differences, a 
single unified explanation for both increased income inequality in the 
US and the large rise in unemployment in Europe, which Tony Atkinson 
(1999, 2000) has termed ‘The Transatlantic Consensus’. The central 
premise of this consensus is, as indicated above, changes in the relative 
demand for skilled and unskilled labour. This, it is suggested, can 
explain most of the stylised facts about advanced country labour 
markets, outlined in Section 2. In addition, despite using different 
methodologies, both trade and labour economists seem to arrive at 
broadly similar empirical conclusions from their respective studies. As 
Blanchflower and Slaughter (1999) observe, “the methodological issues 
surrounding the proper way to gauge trade’s role have not been resolved. 
Nevertheless, what is important to emphasise is that the large majority of 
studies to date regardless of their methodology- find only a small role 
for international trade in rising U.S. income inequality. Product prices, 
labour shifts, trade flows: All these data have been analysed in different 
ways, and the recurring conclusion is that trade has not mattered much.”
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Before we consider more closely the Transatlantic Consensus and the 
technology and trade stories as being the essential causes of earnings and 
income inequality and other labour market deficits in the North, it will 
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be useful to consider the nature of the changes in manufacturing trade 
patterns which have occurred between the North and the South during 
the last three decades. 
 
First, it is indeed true that there has been a very fast increase in 
manufactured imports from the South to the North in the 1970s and 
1980s.  Between 1970 and 1990 the North’s manufactured imports from 
the South rose in volume terms at a rate of about twelve per cent per 
annum.  At the beginning of the period the South accounted for less than 
five per cent of the North’s total manufactured imports; by 1990 this 
figure had increased to fifteen per cent.  However, in terms of any 
overall employment effect on the national economy as a whole, it is 
important to observe that the North’s imports of manufactures from the 
South (excluding China) accounted for no more than 1.5 per cent of 
GDP at the beginning of the 1990s.  It is therefore legitimate to ask, as 
Krugman does, how the observed very large changes in inequality and 
unemployment in Europe and the US could be attributed to these small 
volumes of trading activity.
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Perhaps the answer is that it is not the absolute volume of trade that is 
important but rather the very fast rate of growth of imports.  However, 
this argument also does not find much support in the data.  As figures in 
Tables 6 and 7 suggest, import penetration of the advanced country 
markets between 1958 and 1975 by the then low-waged countries Italy 
and Japan had also increased very fast (Table 7) - almost as quickly as in 
the subsequent period (1975-1992) by today’s developing countries 
(Table 6).  The earlier fast increase did not, however, lead either to mass 
unemployment in Europe or to stagnant wages and greatly increased 
earnings and income inequality in the US.   
 
It will be recalled that West European countries during this earlier fast 
penetration of their markets in the 1950s and 1960s and until 1973 
nevertheless experienced more or less full employment.  They also 
witnessed improved income distribution. Similarly, real wages in the US 
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rose at a rate of two per cent per annum between 1950 and 1973, and 
earnings and income inequality fell. The main reason for these differing 
labour market outcomes in the two periods is that during the 1950s and 
1960s West European and US economies were growing at a much faster 
long-term rate than they have done subsequently
6. This suggests, at the 
very least, that even if one were to accept for the sake of argument that 
the fast growth of imports from low-waged countries is causally 
associated with various labour market deficits, these adverse effects 
could be more than outweighed by other factors e.g. faster overall 
economic growth. 
 
Is it, however, possible to establish a causal link between changes in the 
pattern of North-South trade in manufactures and the unfavourable 
labour market outcomes in the North on the basis of the timings of the 
two sets of changes?  Wood answers this question in the affirmative and 
asserts, using the time patterns of changes in the two variables, a causal 
connection between falls in the share of manufacturing employment and 
the growth of manufactured imports from the South for a cross section 
of advanced countries. 
 
This claim is, however, open to objections. To infer causality between 
trade and job losses, it is necessary to consider not only imports from the 
South and their timings, but also the North’s exports to the South and 
their timings, as well as the effects on the trade and current account 
balances. UNCTAD (1995) has carried out this detailed analysis and 
finds that manufacturing job losses in the North are associated more 
closely with the fall in the North’s exports to the South in the 1980s  
(due to the debt crisis) rather than to any trend acceleration in imports 
from the South during that decade. The UNCTAD authors point out that 
the North’s manufactured imports from the South increased at a faster 
pace in the 1970s than in the 1980s but the difference between the two 
decades is that in the 1970s the North’s exports to the South expanded at 
an even faster rate than its imports. However, in the following decade 
these exports were severely constrained by the South’s debt crisis. 
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UNCTAD economists conclude their comprehensive analysis of the 
pattern of the US manufacturing trade and labour market outcomes in 
the following terms: 
 
“Neither the evolution of manufacturing trade balances nor that of 
import penetration ratios suggests that there is any significantly 
close relation between North-South trade in manufacturing and 
unemployment.  The tiny swing in the trade balance from 1970-
1993 compares to (average) job losses of 15% (in the G7 countries, 
Table 4), and the timing of these losses did not systematically 
coincide with either declines in the North’s overall trade surplus 
with the South or with the rise in imports from the developing 
countries.  Not only was the growth of manufactured imports from 
the South actually faster in the 1970s than in the 1980s, but also 
the most important influence on the trade balance in the 1980s 
came through a decline in Northern exports due to unfavourable 
economic conditions in the South” (parenthesis added, UNCTAD, 
1995). 
 
5. Trade and Technology Theories and Earnings Inequality: a 
Critique 
 
Having examined the relationship between changes in the pattern of 
North-South manufacturing trade and manufacturing employment in 
advanced countries, we now turn to the other part of the Transatlantic 
Consensus i.e., the question of changes in earning and income 
distribution, particularly in countries with flexible labour markets such 
as the US. It will be argued below that both the trade and technology 
theories, as well as the underlying concept of a shift in the demand for 
labour from the unskilled to the skilled workers, are all open to serious 
theoretical and/or empirical limitations. 
 
Consider first the trade story, the intellectual basis for which is provided 
by the Stolper-Samuelson Theorem. The latter is, however, a static 
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construct with highly restrictive assumptions, which makes its 
application to the Transatlantic Consensus problematical.
7 The theorem 
assumes for example perfect competition in product as well as labour 
markets. The latter is ruled out by assumption in the Transatlantic 
Consensus since the consensus is based on the notion that West 
European labour markets are inflexible.  Further it is a two-country, two-
factors, two-products model, but as Davis (1998 a,b) notes, to provide a 
rigorous analytic basis for the Transatlantic Consensus in terms of the 
Stolper-Samuelson framework requires addition of at least another 
country (a European country with rigid labour markets, in addition to a 
US-type developed country and a developing country). However, when 
this is done by considering a three country model, the neat predictions of 
the Transatlantic Consensus of increased earning inequalities in the US 
and greater unemployment in Europe do not follow.    
 
At a more elementary level the trade theory is unsatisfactory as an 
explanation for changes in income distribution as it considers only the 
question of earnings distribution and neglects altogether the distribution 
of profit and rents in the economy. There is considerable evidence to 
suggest that the latter have contributed significantly to greater inequality 
in incomes in the 1980’s in many countries.
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At an empirical level the trade story is not convincing either as earnings 
dispersion has increased not only in the traded sector but also in the far 
bigger non-traded sector.  This suggests some common forces at work 
other than trade.  Moreover, as Krugman (2000) and others pave pointed 
out, despite the relative rise in skills premiums in the 1980’s, the 
demand for skilled workers rose rather than fell in most sectors of the 
economy.  This again points towards a non-trade explanation, indeed, in 
the direction of a broad-based skill-biased technical progress. 
 
Importantly, however, the latest available data on earnings and income 
distribution for the period since the mid-1990’s does not support the 
underlying premise of both trade and technology theories i.e. changes in 
10  
the relative demand for skilled and unskilled labour. Evidence for the 
period 1995-1999 suggests that the bottom decile of wage earners in 
countries such as the US and the UK have gained at the expense of the 
average worker, thus calling into question the shift of demand away 
from unskilled and low paid workers to the skilled and the more highly 
paid.  This is contrary to the predictions of the trade theory since imports 
from developing countries or foreign outsourcing by the large US 
companies, have not slowed down but have continued to increase 
throughout the 1990’s. 
 
The technology theory provides, in general, a better fit with some parts 
of the evidence than the trade explanation, but is subject to its own 
limitations as well as to some of the difficulties indicated above. Skill-
biased technical progress would also for example be difficult to 
reconcile with the 1995-1999 evidence of the gains of the low paid 
workers at the expense of the average worker.  
 
There are also other important difficulties with the technology story. As 
noted earlier income distribution has become more unequal not only 
between industries but also within industries and firms. It has also 
become more unequal in narrowly defined occupations such as lawyers, 
doctors, and cooks. It is difficult to believe that this increased dispersion 
is in each case due to skill biased techniques progress.  There is little to 
suggest that the highest-paid lawyers are being paid relatively even more 
than before because (say) technical progress in the form of information 
technology has improved their skills more than that of the average 
lawyer. 
 
Katz (1999), updating the work of Autor, Katz and Kruger (1998), 
presents further evidence against the technology hypothesis. His analysis 
of relative demand, supply and wages of college high school graduates 
between 1940-1998 suggests that the rate of growth of relative demand 
for college graduates has fallen substantially in the 1990’s, compared not 
only with the 1980’s but also with the 1950’s and the subsequent 
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decades. If the technology hypothesis were valid for the last two 
decades, the data should indicate a trend increase in the rate of growth of 
relative demand for college graduates in the 1980’s and 1990’s, which 
Katz’s figures do not. 
 
Atkinson (2000) provides a telling example of the difficulties of the 
technology theory to explain the observed changes in the income 
distribution in France and in the US.  He notes that in the US during the 
1990s not only did the earnings of the lowest 10% improve relative to 
the median, those of the top decile also increased vis-à-vis the median 
recipient. In France, on the other hand, although the wages of the lowest 
paid rose relative to those of the median earner, there has been no 
change in the position of the top decile of income earners compared to 
the median. It could be argued that unlike the US the position of the 
lowest paid workers in France could have improved because of that 
country’s minimum wage laws rather than because of market forces.   
There is, however, no legal maximum to what people can earn in France, 
suggesting that top earnings are market determined.  These facts are not 
easily compatible with the notion that there is a skill-biased general 
purpose technology which is responsible for the highest paid American 
earners being paid, relative to the median, even more than before.  The 
fact that the market forces, despite the availability of such technologies 
in all industrial countries, do not lead to a similar outcome to that of the 
US for the highest paid earners in France suggests that there are likely to 
be other factors at work. 
 
 
6. Unionisation, full employment and social norms 
 
In view of the theoretical and empirical deficiencies of the Transatlantic 
Consensus and the associated theories of trade and technology in 
accounting for the observed facts about changes in income distribution 
in advanced industrial countries, it is necessary to look at other plausible 
explanations.  Indeed, the domination in recent literature by these two 
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theories, whose flaws have become particularly transparent with the 
availability of the data for the 1990’s, has drawn attention away from 
other types of explanations. There are important empirical studies, based 
on solid theoretical foundations, which emphasise the significance of 
factors such as unionisation, minimum wages, de-industrialisation, the 
rate of un-employment and the broader macro-economic environment in 
influencing income distribution.  The US research shows, for example, 
that the decline of the unions in that country since the 1960s (from 30% 
of the private sector work force at that time to 10% in 1996) has 
contributed about 20% of the observed rise in earnings inequality.
9  
Similarly, Galbraith (1998) reports, on the basis of his analysis of 
inequality in the US wage structure over the long period 1920 - 1992, 
that 70% of the inter-industry wage dispersion could be accounted for by 
a single variable, the rate of unemployment.  At a theoretical level this 
conclusion is compatible with either models of competitive or 
segmented labour markets (McFail, 2000). 
 
The role of de-industrialisation, quite independently of unionisation, as a 
causal factor in explaining increased inequality, has been emphasised by 
Bluestone and Harrison (1982). The reduction in better paid 
manufacturing jobs and increase in less well-paid service sector 
employment has normally an adverse effect on income distribution. 
 
The proponents of the Transatlantic Consensus often draw attention to 
the case of Canada which, unlike the US, despite being closely 
associated with that country in the North American Free Trade Area, did 
not suffer a deterioration in income distribution in the 1980s. This is 
ascribed to the fact that, in contrast to the US situation, the Canadian 
government by subsidising higher education was better able to increase 
the supply of college graduates.  This reduced their earnings relative to 
the unskilled workers, thus contributing to a more equal distribution of 
income than would otherwise have been the case. These 
Canadian/American differences in changes in income inequality in the 
1980s are thus fully compatible with the technology theory and the 
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consequent increased demand for skilled labour.  However, a 
comprehensive multi-variate empirical study by McFail (2000) suggests 
that the most important determinants of income distribution in Canada in 
the 1980s were the level of unemployment and the decline in 
unionisation. De-industrialisation and to a small extent technology (in 
the form of increased supply of male college-educated workers) were 
statistically significant but relatively much less important.  The study 
found the trade variable to be insignificant. 
 
Although these macro-economic and institutional variables (e.g. 
unionisation and minimum wages)
10 are important as determinants of 
changes in wage dispersion and income inequality, they do not explain 
the significant variations at the top end of the distribution in countries 
such as the US and the UK.  As seen before, in both countries there has 
been increased wage dispersion, normally within each industry and 
occupational category, as a consequence of very high incomes being 
earned by the top 10% or 5% of the income recipients. This 
characteristic of changes in income inequality which holds both for the 
1980s and the 1990s cannot be explained without reference to changing 
social norms.  Traditionally studies of income distribution used to pay a 
great deal of attention to the notion of a fair wage and differentials 
between and within occupational categories which are socially 
acceptable.  Such analyses do not find much favour with modern 
economists.  Nevertheless, following Atkinson (1999, 2000), Singh and 
Dhumale (2000), it will be argued below that an analysis of changes in 
inequality in industrial countries would be seriously incomplete without 
reference to changing social norms in this respect during the past half 
century. Atkinson provides an elegant game-theoretic analysis of 
changing social norms, while Singh and Dhumale complement that 
discussion by considering these norms in a historical perspective. 
 
Singh and Dhumale trace the historical evolution of social norms 
concerning income inequality with changing economic circumstances 
and power-relations. During 1950-1973, in the Golden Age of western 
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capitalism, advanced economies expanded at an unprecedented rate of 
almost 5% p.a. compared with a long-term record of about 2% over the 
previous 150 years.  This outstanding economic performance was, 
however, not simply a statistical artefact or an accidental occurrence. 
Glyn et al (1990) and Singh (1995a) suggest that the Golden Age was 
made possible by the adoption of a new economic model in advanced 
countries in the post world-war II period. This model, which differed 
significantly from the one that prevailed countries in these countries in 
the pre war period, emphasized co-operation both at the national level 
between government, employees and business as well as at the 
international level (between nation States).  This co-operative economic 
environment of the Golden Age led to high rates of investment and 
productivity growth, and with relatively equal income distribution, also 
to high rates of consumption.  The latter justified the initial investment 
and encouraged further capital formation in a positive feed-back loop. 
This model of a social market economy was, however, undermined by 
its own success, and after nearly 25 years of more or less full 
employment, it fell victim to the economic shocks of the 1970s. The 
continuation of the model would have required renewal of existing 
institutions as well as establishing new ones, particularly those which 




In the event, the Golden Age model of the social market economy was 
abandoned in the late 1970s and early 1980s in favour of the 
Reagan/Thatcher model of market supremacy.  This evolution of a new 
economic model also involved significant changes in social norms 
towards acceptance of far more unequal income distribution than before.  
The new model involved huge institutional changes such as de-
unionisation, de-regulation, privatisation and other components of 
market supremacy.  These institutional and related changes in social 
norms were more readily embraced in the US and the UK than in the 
continental economies.  This is the reason why in countries such as 
France and Germany, there continue to be much narrower differentials 
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between pays of workers and managers, whereas in the Anglo-Saxon 
countries the huge increase in such differentials since the Golden Age 
has become common place. As seen earlier, it also explains why, while 
being market determined, the French incomes in the top decile have not 
increased relative to those of the middle decile while they have risen 
appreciably in the US and the UK. 
 
7. Policy implications 
 
If this analysis is correct it has rather different policy implications than 
those suggested by trade or technology theories.  The adherents of these 
theories emphasise policies for improved education so as to raise the 
skill level of unskilled workers. Importantly, they do not suggest 
protection to cope with the alleged adverse effects of the Third World 
manufacturing trade, as it is recognised that such trade through a number 
of other (unspecified) channels has overall been of benefit to industrial 
countries.  These economists therefore advocate instead social safety 
nets and adjustment assistance for workers harmed or dislocated by third 
world competition. 
 
The policy thrust of the analysis presented here is rather different. In 
addition to measures to increase unionisation and improve minimum 
wages, it would emphasise faster economic growth and full employment, 
as being important in themselves as well as leading to more equal 
income distribution.  In other papers I have suggested that the main 
constraints on fast growth of the world economy lie today on the 
demand rather than the supply side.
12 The world economy expanded at a 
rate of nearly 5% p.a. during the Golden Age, but has only grown at a 
rate of little over 2% in the subsequent quarter century, despite the 
availability of new information technology.  This technology is regarded 
by scholars of technical change as being at par with the two or three 
most important technological revolutions of the last two centuries, e.g. 
the steam-engine and electricity.  The full potential of this technology is 
not however being realised, mainly because of constraints on the rate of 
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growth of world demand.  The analyses of Singh, and Howes and Singh, 
indicate that the demand constraint is not just a technical question of 
simply changing monetary and fiscal policies in leading economies, but 
is a deeply institutional barrier. To ensure faster, non-inflationary growth 
on a sustained basis would require new co-operative institutions at both 
the national and international levels, suitably adapted in the light of the 
experience of the Golden Age.  The political processes involved in 
achieving this institutional renewal should also help change the social 




1.  See for example, Krugman (2000) and Leamer (2000). 
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TABLE 1: Percentage Changes in Earnings in the U.S. by Skill Group, 
    1979-1995 
 
________________________________________________________________________ 
       M e n   ( % )    W o m e n   ( % )  
 
Top  quintile  workers       1%    21% 
Bottom  quintile  workers      -17    -8 
College  graduates             1    20 
High  School  graduates     -17      -4 
Less  than  high  school  graduates     -27    -11 
Professionals              6      18 
Administrative  support  (clericals)     -14          2 
Machine  operators       -16        -9 
Laborers        -21    n.a. 
Starting  high  school  graduates    -27    -19 
Experienced  high  school  graduates     -21        -4 
Starting  college  graduates      -11          3 
Experienced  college  graduates       -3      21 
________________________________________________________________________ 
Note: Starting workers have 1 to 5 years of experience; experienced workers have 16 to 22 years 
of experience. 
Source:  Freeman  (1999)           
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TABLE 2: Indicators of Earnings inequality in advanced industrial countries 
1979-1989 and 1989-1994/95. Changes in D9/D5 to D5/ D1 ratios. 
 
 
     1979-  1989    1989-  1994/95 
 
     D9/D5   D5/D1   D9/D5   D5/D1 
 
Australia       .02     .02     .06     -.04 
Austria        .02     .00     .00     .07 
Belgium     -.01   -.02   -.02   -.02 
Canada      .03     .08   -.01   -.13 
Finland    .03     .00   -.02   -.10 
France        .02   -.01     .01     .00 
Germany       .01   -.12   -.03   -.08 
Italy      -.03   -.23     .19     .32 
Japan        .05     .00   -.02   -.07 
Netherlands       .03     .00     .02     .01 
New  Zealand       .04     .05     .02   -.03 
Sweden      .02     .01     .03     .00 
United  Kingdom      .09     .05     .03     .02 
United  States       .12     .11     .06     .07 
 
Note: D9/ D5 is the value of the ninth decile over the first decile. D5/D1 is the value of the fifth 
decile over the first decile. 
Source: Blanchflower and Slaughter (1999) 
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United Kingdom  Goodman and Webb (1994) 
Atkinson (1993) 
1981-1991 +++  ++++ 
United States  US Bureau of the Census (1995)  1980-1993  +++  +++ 
Sweden  Gustafsson and Palmer (1993) 
Statistics Sweden (1995) 
1980-1993 ++  +++ 
Australia Saunders  (1994)  1980-1981 
1989-1990 
+ + 
Denmark  Aaberge et al. (1995)  1981-1990  +  + 
New Zealand  Saunders (1994)  1981-1989  +  + 
Japan  Tachabanaki and Yagi (1995) 
Bauer and Mason (1992) 
1981-1990 +  + 
Netherlands  Atkinson, Rainwater, and 
Smeeding (1995) 
Muffels and Nelisen (1996) 
1981-1989 +  + 






Belgium  Cantillon et al. (1994)  1985-1992  +  + 
Canada  Beach and Slotsve (1994) 
Statistics Canada (1994) 
1980-1992 +  0 
Israel LIS  (1995)  1979-1992  +  0 
Finland Uusitalo  (1995)  1981-1992  +++  0 
France Concialdi  (1996)  1979-1989  0  0 
Portugal Rodrigues  (1993)  1980-1990  0  0 
Spain LIS  (1995)  1980-1990  n.a.  0 
Ireland  Callan and Nolan (1993)  1980-1987  +  0 
West Germany  Burkhauser and Poupore (1997) 
Hauser and Becker (1993) 
1983-1990 +  0 
Italy  Brandolini and Sestito (1993) 
Eriksson and Ichino (1995) 
1977-1991 --  -- 
Source: Gottschalk and Smeeding (1997). 
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TABLE 3: Changes in market and disposable income inequality in industrial 
countries, 1980s (cont.) 
 
 
Degree of change is coded as follows: 
 
Designation Interpretation  Rate of change in Gini 
--  Small decline  -5% or more 
0  Zero  -4  to  +4% 
+  Small increase  -5  to  10% 
++  Moderate increase  10  to  15% 
+++  Large increase  16  to  29% 
++++  Extremely large increase  30% or more 
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TABLE 4: Standardised unemployment rate in industrialised countries, 1964-
1999 (average annual percentage changes) 
 
Country  1964-1973 1974-1979 1980-1989 1990-1999 
United States  4.5 6.7 7.3 5.8 
Japan  1.2 1.9 2.5 3.0 
Germany  1.1 3.2 7.0 9.0 
United  Kingdom  3.0 5.0 9.0 7.3 
Total of G7 countries 3.1  5.0  6.9  7.1 
Total EU 15  2.7  4.7  9.0  10.3 
Total  OECD  3.0 4.9 7.2 7.4 
 






TABLE 5:  De-industrialisation - Employment in Manufacturing, 1970-93 in the G-7 countries 
     Employment ('000s)    Change 1970-93 
Country     1970   1993    Percent 
Canada    1638   1697    3.6 
France      5196   3991    -23.2 
Germany     8203   7056    -14 
Italy      3289   2697    -18 
Japan      10880   10924    0.4 
United  Kingdom    7951   4312    -45.7   
United  States     18213   16402    -9.9 
Total  G-7     55371   47081    -15.0 
___________________________________________________________________ 
*For Germany and United Kingdom the last available figures are for 1992  
Source: UNCTAD 1995 
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TABLE 6: Import Penetration by Developing Countries of the Markets for 
Manufactures of the U.S., E.U., and Japan, 1970-92 (percentage) 
 
_____________________________ 
Year   U.S. E.U. Japan 
1970    0.4 0.5 0.2 
1975    0.8 0.9 0.5 
1978    1.4 1.1 0.6 
1980    1.6 1.3 0.7 
1985    2.7 1.7 0.8 
1990    3.8 2.5 1.3 
1992    4.3 2.8 1.3 






TABLE 7 : Import Penetration by Italy and Japan of the Markets for 
Manufactures of the U.S. and E.E.C., 1958-75 (percentage) 
 
  E.E.C. Imports from   U.S. Imports from  
Year  Italy   Japan  Total  
 
Japan Italy  Total 
 
1958 0.4  0.1  0.5  0.2  0.1  0.3 
1960 0.7  0.1  0.8  0.4  0.1  0.5 
1965 1.7  0.3  2  0.6  0.1  0.7 
1970 2.4  0.5  2.9  1  0.2  1.2 
1975 2.9  0.8  3.7  1.5  0.3  1.8 
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